We use multilinear maps to provide a solution to the long-standing problem of public-key broadcast encryption where all parameters in the system are small. In our constructions, ciphertext overhead, private key size, and public key size are all poly-logarithmic in the total number of users. The systems are fully collusion-resistant against any number of colluders. All our systems are based on an O(log N )-way multilinear map to support a broadcast system for N users. We present three constructions based on different types of multilinear maps and providing different security guarantees. Our systems naturally give identity-based broadcast systems with short parameters.
Introduction
Broadcast encryption [FN94] is an important generalization of public-key encryption to the multiuser setting. In a broadcast encryption scheme, a broadcaster encrypts a message for a subset S of users who are listening on a broadcast channel. The broadcaster can encrypt to any set S of its choice, and any user in S can decrypt the broadcast using its secret key. The system is said to be fully collusion resistant if even a coalition of all users outside of S learns nothing about the plaintext. Broadcast systems are regularly used in TV and radio subscription services where broadcasts are encrypted for currently active subscribers. They are also used in encrypted file systems where a file is encrypted so that only users who have access to the file can decrypt it.
The efficiency of a broadcast system is measured in the ciphertext overhead: the number of bits in the ciphertext beyond what is needed for the description of the recipient set S and the symmetric encryption of the plaintext payload. The shorter the overhead, the better. We say that the system has low overhead if the ciphertext overhead depends at most logarithmically on the number of users N in the system. Existing constructions with low ciphertext overhead. Several broadcast systems are fully collusion resistant with low ciphertext overhead. The first such system by Boneh, Gentry, and Waters [BGW05] is built from bilinear maps. It has constant ciphertext overhead and short secret keys, but the public encryption key size is linear in the number of users N . Other systems using bilinear-maps achieve adaptive security [GW09, DPP07] and some are even identity-based [GW09, Del07, SF07] , but the public encryption key is always large. with ciphertext size of O(r). Further combinatorial solutions (e.g., [NP00, DF03] ) achieve similar parameters. A broadcast encryption system is said to be recipient-private if broadcast ciphertexts reveal nothing about the intended set of recipients [BBW06, LPQ12, FP12] . Our broadcast systems are not recipient private, and it is a long-standing open problem to build a low-overhead recipient-private broadcast system. Such a system was recently built using indistinguishability obfuscation [BZ13] , but constructing such systems under weaker assumptions remains open.
Preliminaries

Broadcast Encryption
We begin by defining broadcast encryption. A (public key) identity-based broadcast encryption scheme consists of three randomized algorithms:
Setup(ID): Sets up a broadcast scheme for identity space ID. It outputs public parameters params as well as a master secret key msk KeyGen(msk, u): Takes the master secret key and a user u ∈ ID and outputs a secret key sk u for user u. Enc(params, S): The encryption algorithm takes the public parameters and a polynomial sized set S ⊆ ID of recipients, and produces a pair (Hdr, K). We refer to Hdr as the header, and K as the message encryption key.
The message is encrypted using a symmetric encryption scheme with the key K to obtain a ciphertext c. The overall ciphertext is (Hdr, c). Dec(params, u, sk u , S, Hdr): The decryption algorithm takes the header Hdr and the secret key for user u, and if u ∈ S, outputs the message encryption key K. If u / ∈ S, the decryption algorithm outputs ⊥.
To actually decrypt the overall ciphertext (Hdr, c), user u runs Dec to obtain K, and then decryption c using K to obtain the message.
For correctness, we require that the decryption algorithm always succeeds when it is supposed to. That is, for every (params, msk) output by Setup(ID), every set S ⊆ ID, every sk u output by KeyGen(msk, u), and (Hdr, K) outputted by Enc(params, S) where u ∈ S, that Dec(params, u, sk u , S, Hdr) = K.
For security, several notions of security are possible. We start by defining active chosen ciphertext security. For any adversary A, let EXP(b) denote the following experiment on A:
Setup: The challenger runs (params, msk) ← Setup(ID), and gives A the public key params.
Secret Key Queries:
A may adaptively make secret key queries for user u. In response, the challenger runs sk u ← KeyGen(msk, u) and gives sk u to A.
CCA Queries:
A may make chosen ciphertext queries on tuples (u, S, Hdr). The challenger responds with Dec(params, u, sk u , S, Hdr) where sk u ← KeyGen(msk, u) 1 .
Challenge:
A submits a set S * ⊂ ID, subject to the restriction that u / ∈ S * for any user u requested in a secret key query. The challenger lets (Hdr * , K * 0 ) ← Enc(params, S * ). If b = 0, the challenger gives (Hdr * , K * 0 ) to the adversary. If b = 1, the challenger computes a random key K * 1 and gives (Hdr * , K * 1 ) to the adversary. More Secret Key Queries: A may continue making secret key queries for users u / ∈ S * More CCA Queries: A may continue making CCA queries on headers Hdr = Hdr * 2 .
Guess:
A produces a guess b for b.
Using a simple hybrid argument, we can assume the adversary makes only a single challenge query. Let W b be the event that A outputs 1 in EXP(b). We define the adaptive CCA advantage of A, as We will also consider several weaker notions of security. For example, we get static security if we require A to commit to the challenge set S * before seeing the public parameters. We also get CPA security if we do not allow chosen ciphertext queries. In this paper, we will be focusing on the following notion of static CPA security, but will also discuss the other variants: Definition 2.2. A broadcast encryption scheme is statically secure under a chosen plaintext attack (statically CPA-secure) if, for all polynomial time adversaries A that must commit to S * before seeing the public parameters and cannot make CCA queries, BE (adv) A is negligible.
Multilinear Maps
We now review multilinear maps [BS03, GGH13a, CLT13] . A multilinear map consists of two algorithms:
Setup(n): Sets up an n-linear map. It outputs n groups G 1 , . . . , G n of prime order p, along with generators g i ∈ G i . We call G 1 the source group, G n the target group, and G 2 , . . . , G n−1 intermediate groups.
e i,j (g, h): Takes in two elements g ∈ G i and h ∈ G j with i + j ≤ n, and outputs an element of G i+j such that
We often omit the subscripts and just write e. We can also generalize e to multiple inputs as e(h (1) , . . . , h (k) ) = e(h (1) , e(h (2) , . . . , h (k) )).
We sometimes call g a i as a level-i encoding of a. The scalar a itself could be referred to as a level-0 encoding of a. Then the map e combines a level i encoding and a level j encoding, and produces a level i + j encoding of the product.
We will make use of asymmetric multilinear maps. In such maps, groups are indexed by integer vectors rather than integers. The pairing operations maps G v 1 × G v 2 into G v 1 +v 2 . More precisely, we have the following algorithms: Setup(n) Sets up an n-linear map, where n ∈ Z is some positive integer vector. It outputs a description of groups G v of prime order p where v are non-negative integer vectors and v ≤ n (that is, the comparison must hold component-wise). It also outputs a description of generators g v ∈ G v 3 . Let e i be the ith standard basis vector, with a 1 at position i and a 0 elsewhere. We call G e i the ith source group, G n the target group, and the rest of the G v groups are intermediate groups.
We note that current candidates of multilinear maps [GGH13a, CLT13] depart from the ideal notions of multilinear maps described above. In particular, in these candidates, representations of group elements are not unique and contain a noise term that can cause errors during group and multilinear operations. While we present our constructions using ideal multilinear maps for simplicity, we stress that our constructions can easily be instantiated using current non-ideal candidates. We need multilinear maps with the following properties:
• A way to hide the group and multilinear operations that lead to a particular element. In current multilinear maps, this is obtained by performing a re-randomization procedure which makes the representation of an element statistically independent of the operations that lead to that element.
• A way, given any representation of an element in the target group, to "extract" a canonical representation of that element. This is handled by a "zero-test parameter" in current maps.
• The ability for the person who sets up the map to compute elements of the form g α x for exponentially-large x. In ideal multilinear maps, this would be accomplished by computing z = α x in Z p , and then computing g z . However, with current multilinear maps, it is not possible for normal users to compute g z for a specific z of their choice 4 . However, the person who sets up the map knows a trapdoor that does allow computing g z for any z ∈ Z p .
• The ability to generate asymmetric multilinear maps for any positive integer vector n ∈ Z . Section 4.3 of [GGH13a] shows how to do this.
• A way to make sure the noise growth does not cause any errors during normal execution of our protocols. Since there is no circular dependence between the parameters of the multilinear map and the number of operations our protocols require, we can set the parameters so the noise stays small enough to avoid errors.
Our Asymmetric Multilinear Map Construction
In this section, we give our first construction of identity-based broadcast encryption from multilinear maps. Our starting point is the scheme of Boneh, Gentry, and Waters [BGW05] , henceforth referred to as the BGW scheme. Recall in their scheme, the public parameters consist of O(N ) source group elements (where N is the number of users), secret keys and headers are a constant number of source group elements, and the message encryption key is a group element in the target group. Our goal is to shrink the public key size to O(log N ) group elements. We accomplish this by embedding the BGW scheme in a multilinear map, where the BGW parameters lie in an intermediate group. The BGW public parameters can then be derived from a small number of elements in the source group of the map -these few source group elements are the new public key. In more detail, the significant component of the BGW public key are the elements
. The rest of the BGW public keys, secret keys, and header components are also element in G 1 , whereas the message encryption key is an element in the group G 2 .
Let N = 2 n − 1 for some integer n, and let n = ( n+1 1s 1, . . . , 1) be the vector of n + 1 1s. Our idea is to use an asymmetric multilinear map, where the target group is G 2n . We note that pairing two elements in G n gives an element in G 2n . Thus, while the entire multilinear map is asymmetric, the pairing operation acts symmetrically on the group G n . Now we replace the groups G 1 and G 2 in the BGW scheme with G n and G 2n . Thus Z u = g α u n . Rather than explicitly include the Z u in the public parameters, we give a few group elements in the groups G e i where e i are the standard basis vectors. Specifically, we provide the parameters X i = g α (2 i ) e i for i = 0, . . . , n − 1. By pairing various subsets of these X i together, we can build all of the Z u for u ≤ 2 n − 1 = N . In particular, if u = n−1 i=0 u i 2 i is the binary representation of u, then
where X 0 i g 1 e i = g e i and X 1 i g 0 e i = X i To allow computation of Z u for u ≥ 2 n + 1 = N + 2, we might decide to publish g α (2 n ) en . However, this would allow computation of Z N +1 , which will break the security of the BGW scheme. Therefore, we instead publish X n = g α (2 n +1) en . Then, for u ∈ [N + 2, 2N ], let u = u − (2 n + 1) = n−1 i=0 u i 2 i . Then we can write
Now we make the observation that O(log N ) graded encodings remain efficient even up to exponential N . Therefore, we can actually make our scheme identity-based, where identities are bit strings of length n with the caveat that the 0 n is not a valid identity. Now we give our entire construction:
Construction 3.1. Let Setup be the setup algorithm for a multilinear map, where groups have order p. Our first identity-based broadcast scheme consists of the following algorithms: Setup(n): Takes as input the length n of identities. Let ID = {0, 1} n \ {0 n } be the identity space.
Let n be the all-ones vector of length n + 1. Run Setup on 2n, obtaining the public parameters params for a multilinear map with target group G 2n .
Choose a random α ∈ Z p and let X i = g α (2 i ) e i for i = 0, . . . , n − 1 and let X n = g α (2 n +1) en . Also choose a random γ ∈ Z p and let Y = g γ n . Lastly, let W = g α (2 n ) 2n . The public key is
The master secret key is (α, γ).
Enc(params, S): Recall that we can compute Z j for j ∈ [1, 2 n − 1] from the public parameters {X i } i∈{0,...,n−1} . Pick a random t ∈ Z p and compute the key and header as
and
If C 0 and C 1 are as above, then we can write
Most of the terms cancel, leaving c = tα 2 n as desired.
Implementation details. As mentioned in Section 2, there are some minor complications with implementing our scheme using current multilinear map constructions [GGH13a, CLT13], but we stress that these complications do not affect the semantics of our scheme. First, during normal operations, computing g α 1 for a random α involves computing a "level-0" encoding of a random (unknown) α, and then pairing with g 1 . In order to compute g α 2 1 , we would pair g 1 with the level-0 encoding twice. However, the noise growth with repeated pairing operations would prevent us from computing g α (2 i ) 1 for sufficiently high powers of i. Instead, the setup algorithm must choose an explicit (known) α ∈ Z p , compute the various α 2 i , encode these powers as level-0 encodings, and only then pair with g 1 . This requires knowing the secrets used to set up the multilinear map, meaning the broadcaster must set up the map himself and cannot rely on maps generated by trusted parties. Note, however, that this exponentiation is only required during setup, and not encryption or decryption, meaning the secrets can be discarded immediately after setup, and anyone can still broadcast using the public parameters.
To make sure the header does not leak any important information, we also need to re-randomize the header components. This means re-randomization parameters need to be included for the group G n . No other re-randomization parameters are necessary.
Before discussing security, we must discuss our new security assumption, which is closely related to the bilinear Diffe-Hellman Exponent assumption (BDHE) as used in BGW.
The Hybrid Diffie-Hellman Exponent Assumption (HDHE) Assumption
We define the (computational) n-Hybrid Diffie-Hellman Exponent problem as follows: Let params ← Setup (2n) where n is the all-ones vector of length n + 1. Choose α ∈ Z p at random, and let
for i = 0, . . . , n − 1 and X n = g α (2 n +1) en . Choose a random t ∈ Z p and let V = g t n . Given
.
We now define the decisional n-Hybrid Diffie-Hellman Expoent problem as, given the tuple
or a random element of G 2n , to distinguish the two cases.
Definition 3.2. We say the decisional n-Hybrid Diffie-Hellman Exponent assumption holds for Setup if, for any polynomial n and probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, A has negligible advantage in solving the n-Hybrid Diffie-Hellman Exponent problem.
Given the X i for i = 0, . . . , n − 1, it is straightforward to compute g α j n for any j ∈ [0, 2 n − 1]. Moreover, including X n , it is straightforward to extend this to j ∈ [2 n +1, 2 n+1 ]. However, computing
from the X i and V appears difficult. The reason is that we only have one term that depends on t, namely V . So to compute K, we would need to pair V with some combination of the X i . In other words, we need to be able to compute g α (2 n ) n from the X i . However, since n has a one in each component, we can never pair any of the X i with itself. This means we can only compute products of terms of the form e(X s 0
Notice that we can never include an X n , since then we would already exceed the desired degree of 2 n . Put another way, we can only compute products of terms of the form
, and i∈S 2 i < 2 n for all subsets S ⊆ [0, n − 1]. This is the basis for our assumption that the n-HDHE assumption is hard. In Appendix B, we discuss the difficulty of our assumption in the generic multilinear map model.
Security Of Our Construction
With our assumption defined, we can now state and prove the security of our scheme: Theorem 3.3. Let Setup be the setup algorithm for a multilinear map, and suppose that the decisional n-Hybrid Diffie-Hellman Exponent assumption holds for Setup . Then the identity-based broadcast encryption scheme in Construction 3.1 is a statically CPA-secure.
Proof. Our proof closely follows the security proof for BGW [BGW05] . Suppose we have an adversary A that breaks the security of the scheme. We use A to build an adversary B that breaks the decisional n-HDHE problem for Setup . B works as follows:
where n is the all-ones vector of length n + 1.
where the Z j are calculated from the X i as before. This amounts to setting
Since r is uniform in Z p and independent of α, so is γ. B also computes W = e(g e 0 , g e 1 , . . . , g e n−2 , X n−1 , g en ) and W = e(W , W )
Observe that W = g α 2 n 2n .
• Now A is allowed to ask for private keys for users u / ∈ S. B computes
Observe that
as desired.
• When A asks for the challenge, B lets Hdr = (V, V r ) and responds with (Hdr, K). Observe that
, then K is the correct key for this header.
• When A returns a guess b for which K it is given, B returns b as its guess.
As shown above, B perfectly simulates the view of A in the broadcast encryption security game. Therefore, B has the same advantage as A, which must therefore be negligible, as desired.
Our Symmetric Multilinear Map Construction
In this section, we give our second construction of broadcast encryption, this time from traditional symmetric multilinear maps. That is, we do not require the more complicated asymmetric structure of Construction 3.1, but can use a basic multilinear map. The idea, however, is very similar. We implement BGW [BGW05] in middle levels of the multilinear map, and use elements in the bottom level to generate the BGW public parameters. Similar to the graded encoding scheme, the BGW parameters will have the form Z u = g α u n , which can be computed from the public parameters
However, we run into a problem. With asymmetric maps, we could enforce that X i could not be paired with itself. This was used to ensure that Z 2 n was not computable given X i for i = 0, . . . , n. However, in the symmetric multilinear map setting, X n−1 could be paired with itself, giving Z 2 n . Instead, we create a hole by limiting the total number of X i that can be paired together. If we allow only n − 1 of them to be paired together, the first hole occurs at Z 2 n −1 . We therefore set N = 2 n − 2 so that the hole is at N + 1 as in BGW.
Notice that a second hole occurs at Z 2 n +2 n−1 −1 , and since 2 n + 2 n−1 − 1 < 2(2 n − 2) = 2N , we can not yet compute all the Z u needed by BGW. One possible fix is to include extra X i that can be used to fill in the unwanted holes. Instead, we opt to restrict the bit representations of all identities in the system to having the same Hamming weight. We show that this allows the computation of all the necessary Z u .
We now describe our scheme:
Construction 4.1. Let Setup be the setup algorithm for a multilinear map, where groups have order p. Our second identity-based broadcast scheme consists of the following algorithms:
Setup(n, ) Sets up a broadcast scheme for n-bit identities with Hamming weight . Run Setup on n + − 1, obtaining the public parameters params for a multilinear map with target group
KeyGen(params, α, γ, u) The secret key for an identity u ∈ {0, 1} n of Hamming weight is
Enc(params, S) Let Z j = g α j n−1 . We will show shortly that we can compute all of the necessary Z j from the X i . Pick a random t ∈ Z p and compute the key and header as
Dec(params, u, sk u , S, Hdr) If u / ∈ S, output ⊥. Otherwise, write Hdr = (C 0 , C 1 ). Also let Z u = g α u . We will shortly show that Z u can be computed from the X i . Compute
We need to show how to compute Z j and Z j .
for i = 0, . . . , n. Then, using group multiplications and paring operations on the X i , it is possible to compute:
• Z j for j ∈ [1, 2 n − 2] of weight exactly .
• Z 2 n −1−j for j ∈ [1, 2 n − 2] of weight exactly .
• Z 2 n −1−j+u for j, u ∈ [1, 2 n − 2], j = u of weight exactly .
Proof. Let h(j) denote the Hamming weight of j. First, observe that we can easily compute g α j h(j) for j ∈ [2 n − 1] by paring together X i where the ith bit of j is 1. This allows us to compute the Z j .
We can also compute g α (2 n −1−j) n− for any j of weight exactly . Thus, we can pair with g −1 to get Z 2 n −1−j . Now we show how to compute Z 2 n −1−j+u . 2 n − 1 − j, written as a bit string, has Hamming weight n − . Therefore, write 2 n − 1 − j = i∈T 2 i for some subset T ⊆ [0, n − 1] of size n − . Similarly, write u = i∈U 2 i for some subset U ⊆ [0, n − 1] of size . Notice that U and T are only disjoint if 2 n − 1 − j + u = 2 n − 1, in which case j = u. Since we do not allow this case, there must be someî ∈ [0, n − 1] inside U and T . Then we can write
which is the sum of n + − 1 powers of two. This means we can write
which is the pairing of n + − 1 of the X i , as desired.
Setting n and
Suppose we want to handle λ-bit identities. We would map those identities to bit strings of length n and weight . Therefore, we need λ ≥ log 2 n A simple solution which minimizes n (and hence the number of elements in the public parameters) is to set n = λ + (log 2 λ)/2 + 1 and = n/2 . However, for existing multilinear map constructions, the multilinearity itself is expensive, so we might try to minimize the total multilinearity n + − 1. When = n/2 , the total multilinearity is roughly 1.5(λ + (log 2 λ)/2). However, setting n ≈ 1.042(λ + (log 2 λ)/2) and ≈ 0.398(λ + (log λ)/2) gives us roughly 2 λ identities with total multilinearity about 1.440(λ + (log λ)/2), slightly beating the trivial construction. The following table gives the settings of n and which minimize the total multilinearity for common identity lengths:
Length of identities (λ)
n Total Multilinearity (n + − 1)  128  138 52  189  160  175 62  236  256  272 103  374  512  545 200  744 Implementation As with Construction 3.1, we must take advantage of the secrets used to construct the multilinear map to compute the X i . We also need to re-randomize the header components. This time, however, there are two groups that need re-randomization terms: G and G n−1 . No other re-randomization parameters are necessary.
The Multilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent Assumption
We define the computational (n, )-multilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent ((n, )-MDHE) Problem as follows: Let params ← Setup (n + − 1). Choose random α, t ∈ Z p , and let X i = g α (2 i ) 1 for i = 0, . . . , n. Let V = g t . Given ({X i } i∈[0,n] , V ), the goal is to compute K = g tα (2 n −1) n+ −1 . As before, we define the decisional version as the problem of distinguishing K from a random element in G n+ −1 .
Definition 4.3. We say the decisional (n, )-multilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent assumption holds for Setup if, for any polynomial n and probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, A has negligible advantage in solving the (n, )-multilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent problem. This problem appears difficult for the same reasons as the n-HDHE assumption from Section 3. Computing K = g tα (2 n −1) n+ −1 requires pairing V = g t with a term g α (2 n −1) n−1 , which must in turn be computed from the X i . However, there is no way to pair at most n − 1 of the X i to create the desired exponent 2 n − 1. In Appendix B, we discuss the difficulty of the (n, )-MDHE problem in the generic multilinear map model.
Security of Our Construction
With our assumption defined, we can now state the security of our scheme: Theorem 4.4. Let Setup be the setup algorithm for a multilinear map, and suppose that the decisional (n, )-multilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent assumption holds for Setup . Then the identitybased broadcast encryption scheme in Construction 4.1 is a statically CPA-secure.
Proof. Again, our proof follows BGW [BGW05] . Suppose we have an adversary A that breaks the security of the scheme. We use A to build an adversary B that breaks the decisional MDHE problem for Setup . B works as follows:
for i = 0, . . . , n for a random α ∈ Z p -V = g t for a random t ∈ Z p -K = g tα (2 n −1) n+ −1 or K is a random element in G n+ −1 .
• B simulates A until A submits a subset S ⊆ [1, 2 n − 2] of users that all have Hamming weight .
• B chooses a random r ∈ Z p . It sets
Since r is uniform in Z p and independent of α, so is γ. B computes W = e(X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X n−1 , g −1 )
Observe that W = g 2 n −1 n+ −1 .
• B gives α the public parameters (W,
• Now A is allowed to ask for private keys for users u / ∈ S of Hamming weight . B computes
• When A asks for the challenge, B lets Hdr = (V, e(V, g n−1− ) r ) and responds with (Hdr, K).
Observe that e(V, g n−1− ) r = g rt n−1 = g t(γ+ u∈S α (2 n −1−u) ) n−1 which means (V, e(V, g n−1− ) r ) is a valid header for the set S. Also, observe that if K = g tα (2 n −1) n+ −1 , then K is the correct key for this header.
Our Third Construction
In this section, we give our third and final broadcast scheme. This scheme is based on the basic broadcast scheme of Gentry and Waters [GW09] , henceforth called the GW scheme. Like the BGW scheme, the GW scheme has public keys consisting of O(N ) elements, where N is the number of users. Our idea is to, similar to Constructions 3.1 and 4.1, run the GW scheme in the higher levels of a multilinear map, and derive the public key elements from O(log N ) low-level elements.
However, unlike the BGW public parameters, which are all derived from a single scalar α ∈ Z p , each of the GW public key elements are derived from a separate random scalar. Therefore, we cannot possibly hope to simulate the GW public key elements exactly. Instead, we we generate them using a Naor-Reingold-style PRF [NR97] .
Also, unlike the BGW scheme, the secret keys in the GW scheme have O(N ) group elements. To make our scheme more efficient, and more importantly to make our scheme identity-based, we need to shrink the secret keys to O(log N ) elements. To accomplish this, we observe that the secret key components are actually some of the outputs of another Naor-Reingold-style PRF, and we can allow the secret key holder to compute just those outputs by puncturing the PRF, similar to Boneh and Waters [BW13] .
We now present out scheme:
Construction 5.1. Let Setup be the setup algorithm for a multilinear map, where groups have order p. Our final identity-based broadcast scheme consists of the following algorithms:
Setup(n) Takes as input the length n of identities. Run the setup algorithm for a multilinear map, Setup , to construct an n + 1-linear map with parameters params . Draw a random α ∈ Z p . For i = 0, . . . , n − 1 and b = 0, 1, draw random β i,b ∈ Z p . The public key is
For any user u ∈ {0, 1} n , note that we can compute
Observe that for v = u, we can compute Z ru v by finding an i * where v i * = 1 − u i * , and computing
Enc(params, S) Choose a random t ∈ Z p and compute the key and header as
where Z u are computed as above.
Dec(params, u, sk u , S, Hdr) If u / ∈ S, output ⊥. Otherwise, write Hdr = (C 0 , C 1 ). Compute
Observe that if (C 0 , C 1 ) are as above, we can write k as g c n+1 where
Correctness follows from the comments above.
Differences from GW. In the Gentry and Waters scheme [GW09] , the Z u are generated independently and given explicitly in the public parameters (as elements of the source group G 1 ). In our scheme, the Z u are generated pseudorandomly by means of a Naor-Reingold PRF. Similarly, in the GW scheme, the Z ru v for v = u are also given explicitly to user u. In our scheme, we note that the Z ru v for fixed u actually form another Naor-Reignold PRF, which we puncture at the point u to allow user u to compute the necessary values without learning Z ru u . Our puncturing follows the puncturing used by Boneh and Waters [BW13] .
Comparison to Constructions 3.1 and 4.1. Construction 5.1 has a couple advantages and disadvantages over our previous schemes:
• Unlike the BGW-based schemes, there are no high-degree terms being generated. This means we do not need the secret parameters for the multilinear map to set up our scheme. Therefore, we can use a map from some trusted third party. We do, however, need to make sure rerandomization parameters are available in the groups G 1 and G n to re-randomize the header elements. If we are using a map that we did not set up, we also need to re-randomize the user secret keys.
• To handle identities of length λ, the total multilinearity of Construction 5.1 is λ + 1. Compare this to 2λ and 1.440(λ + (log 2 λ)/2) from the previous constructions.
• On the negative side, secret keys in Construction 5.1 consist of O(log N ) group elements, compared to the single element secret keys of the previous schemes.
• For security, we unfortunately are unable to prove security relative to a non-interactive assumption. In the original GW scheme, the security proof involved manipulating the Z u for u / ∈ S. Since each of the Z u are independent in the GW scheme, this is achievable. For our scheme, however, the Z u are generated from O(log N ) parameters, meaning we cannot modify them independently. Instead, in Appendix B, we opt to prove security in the generic multilinear map model. We note, however, that we obtain a better generic security theorem than is possible for Constructions 3.1 and 4.1.
A Extensions and Variations
A.1 Parameter Trade-offs
To handle N identities, our symmetric multilinear map scheme (Section 4) requires a total multilinearity of roughly 1.5 log 2 N , and roughly log 2 N group elements in the public key. Contrast this to the BGW scheme, which only requires multilinearity 2, but needs roughly 2N public key elements. Since multilinearity is expensive, here we discuss a generalization of both the BGW scheme and Construction 4.1 which allows interpolating between the two. By instantiating the scheme with the right parameters, it may be possible to obtain better performance.
Observe in our scheme that the main reason for the multilinearity is so that we can compute many different Z u , Z u from relatively few X i . For a set ID of users, the Z u , Z u we need to compute are:
• Z u for u ∈ ID • Z h−u and Z h−j+u for j, u ∈ ID, j = u, for some "hole" h.
We can generalize the requirements using the following definition:
Definition A.1. Let ID be a finite set of positive integers. We say a set T of positive integers (h, n, )-covers ID if:
• h > max u∈ID u.
• For every u ∈ ID, u can be represented as a sum of at most (possibly repeating) integers in T .
• For every u, j ∈ ID, h − u and h − j + u can be represented as a sum of at most n − 1 (possibly repeating) integers in T .
• h can be represented as a sum of at most n + − 1 (possibly repeating) integers in T .
• h cannot be represented as a sum of fewer than n (possibly repeating) integers in T .
Then the public key will consist of X i = g α i 1 for i ∈ T (along with the value V ). The requirements for T show that the necessary values of Z u , Z u (as well as W ) can be derived from the X i . The security assumption the scheme will be based on the following problem. Let params ← Setup (n + − 1), and choose random α, t ∈ Z p . Let X i = g α i 1 for i ∈ T and V = g t . Given ({X i } i∈T , V ), the goal is to compute K = g tα h n+ −1 . We call this the (T, h, n, )-(computational) generalized multilinear Diff-Hellman Exponent (gMDHE) assumption. The decisional variant is the problem of distinguishing K from a random element in G n+ −1 . The requirements for the hole h ensure that the (T, h, n, )-gMDHE problem is not trivially solvable. Now we give some examples: 2N ] , h = N + 1, n = 2, and = 1. Here we recover the original BGW construction.
• ID = {u ∈ [1, 2 n − 2] : u has weight exactly }, T = {2 0 , 2 1 , 2 2 , . . . , 2 n }, h = 2 n − 1. Here we recover the scheme in Construction 4.1.
• ID = {u ∈ [1, 2 n − 2] : u has weight at most }, T = {2 0 , 2 1 , 2 2 , . . . , 2 n , 2 n + 1}, h = 2 n − 1.
Here we get a variant of the scheme in Construction 4.1 where identities do not all need the same weight. This construction shaves of logarithmic additive factors in the total multilinearity n + − 1, at the expense of a more complicated complexity assumption. {1, 2, 3, . . . , b − 1, b, 2b, . . . , (b − 1) 
Here we get a variant of the scheme that uses a base other than 2. The result is a somewhat larger identity space (or reduced multilinearity) at the expense of a significantly larger public key. Note that when b = N ,n = 2, we again get the BGW scheme.
A.2 CCA Security
Similar to the BGW construction, we can also obtain CCA security. The construction utilizes a one-time signature scheme (G, Sign, Ver). The main difference is that verification keys for the signature scheme cannot directly be hashed into the necessary group G n−1 , as described by BGW. The reason is that, in current multilinear map constructions, users cannot sample elements from intermediate groups directly, but must instead combine elements of the public parameters together to arrive at group elements. Note that in the multilinear map construction of Garg, Gentry, and Halevi, users can sample the source group G 1 directly. Therefore, we will hash verification keys into G 1 , and then lift the element to G n−1 by pairing with g n−2 .
B Security Using Generic Multilinear Maps
In this section, we discuss the security of our schemes in the generic multilinear map model. In particular, explain why our two assumptions, the n-HDHE and (n, )-MDHE assumptions, are secure in the generic model, provided p is sufficiently large. This shows Constructions 3.1 and 4.1 are statically secure in this model for sufficiently large p. We also directly show that Construction 5.1 is adaptively secure in this model for much smaller p. We note that adaptive proofs of security can also be obtained for Constructions 3.1 and 4.1, though for much larger p.
Generic Multilinear Maps Generic multilinear maps are a generalization of the generic group model. Let n ∈ Z be the target integer vector. We represent the groups G v for v ∈ Z using a random injective function ξ : Z p × Z → {0, 1} m mapping elements of the additive group Z p and vectors v into strings of length m. We are given oracles Mult and Pair to compute the induced multiplication and pairing operation. More precisely, any algorithm in the generic multilinear map model interacts with the multilinear map using the following queries:
Encode(x, v) If v ∈ Z is a non-negative integer vector satisfying v ≤ n, then the response is ξ(x, v). Otherwise return ⊥. Note that we can recover the generator g v for the group G v as Encode(1, v) .
Otherwise, return ⊥.
Generic security of our assumptions. Using the techniques of Boneh, Boyen, and Goh [BBG05] , it is straightforward to prove hardness results for the n-HDHE and (n, )-MDHE assumptions in the generic multilinear map model. However, these assumptions involve high degree exponents (as high as α 2 n ), meaning the adversary can construct high degree polynomials (namely, degree n2 n ) in the secrets of the assumption. As a result, we can only bound the generic adversary's advantage to ≈ t 2 2 n /p, where t is the number of queries the adversary makes. This means we must set p to be somewhat large: if n = λ, λ-bit security would require p ≈ 2 3λ , rather than the usual p ≈ 2 λ . The generic security of our assumptions, together with Theorems 3.3 and 4.4 also shows the generic static security of Constructions 3.1 and 4.1. We note that it is also possible to show generic adaptive security for these schemes. However, these generic security results still require p ≥ 2 3λ . Next, we show that, for Construction 5.1, we can actually obtain adpative generic security for p ≈ 2 λ . Theorem B.1. For any generic adversary A whose total number of queries to Encode, Mult, Pair is polynomial, A has negligible advantage in breaking the adaptive security of Construction 5.1, provided 1/p is negligible.
Proof. Let A be a generic adaptive attacker. A plays the following game:
• The challenger choose random β i,b from Z p for i ∈ [1, n] and b ∈ {0, 1}, random α, t ∈ Z p , and a random bit c ∈ {0, 1}. The challenger sets k c = αt and k 1−c to be a random element in Z p .
,b∈{0,1} , as well as W = ξ(α, n + 1).
• A can adaptively make secret key queries for identities u ∈ {0, 1} n . In response, A receives {U
We require that for a particular identity u, A can only make a single key query for u.
• A can also adaptively make queries to Encode, Mult, Pair.
• A makes a challenge query on a set S, subject to the restriction that u / ∈ S for any u queried in a secret key query. In response, A receives
In addition, A receives K 0 = ξ(k 0 , n + 1) and K 1 = ξ(k 1 , n + 1).
• A can continue making secret key queries for identities u / ∈ S.
• A produces a guess c for c. Now consider an algorithm B that plays the above game with A. Rather than choose values for β i,b , α, t, r u , k 0 , k 1 , algorithm B treats them as formal variables. B maintains a list
where p j is a polynomial in the variables {β i,b } i∈[1,n],b∈{0,1} , α, t, k 0 , k 1 , {r u }, the integer i j indexes the groups, and ξ j is a string in {0, 1} m . The list is initialized with the tuples (β i,b , 1, ξ 2i+b−1 ) for randomly generated strings ξ 2i+b−1 ∈ {0, 1} m , as well as (α, n + 1, ξ 2n+1 ) for a random string ξ 2n+1 ∈ {0, 1} m . Initially, L contains 2n + 1 entries.
The game starts with B giving A the tuple of strings {ξ i } i∈ [1,2n+1] . Now, A is allowed to make the following queries: 1, ξ) to L for a randomly generated ξ ∈ {0, 1} m . It also adds tuples (r u β i,1−u i , 1, ξ i ) for i = 1, . . . , n, where the ξ i are generated at random in {0, 1} m . Finally, it adds the tuple (α + r u · n i=1 β i,u i , n, ξ) for another randomly generated ξ ∈ {0, 1} m . B responds with the list of ξ values generated in this step.
Enc(S): B creates new formal variables t, k 0 , k 1 . It adds several tuples to L:
Where the ξ i are randomly generated. B gives A the strings ξ 1 , ξ 2 , ξ 3 , ξ 4 .
B can increase m arbitrarily, thus making strings ξ hard to guess. Therefore, we can assume without loss of generality that A only makes Mult and Pair queries on strings obtained from B.
After a polynomial number of queries, A returns a guess c ∈ {0, 1}. Now, B chooses a random c ∈ {0, 1}. If also chooses random values for β i,b , α, t ∈ Z p , r u . It also chooses a random k ∈ Z p . B sets k c = αt and k 1−c = k.
The simulation provided by B is perfect unless out choices for the variables β i,b , α, t, k 0 , k 1 results in an equality between values for two values p k , p that is not an equality for polynomials. More precisely the simulation is perfect unless for some k, the following hold:
. . ) = 0, yet the polynomials p k , p are not equal.
Let Fail be the event that these conditions hold for some k, . We need to bound the probability that Fail occurs. First, prior to choosing values for all the variables, consider setting k b = αt as polynomials. We claim that this does not create any new polynomial equalities. Claim B.2. Substituting the formal variable k b with the polynomial αt does not create any new polynomial equalities. That is, if p k = p before the substitution, the same is true after the substitution Before proving Claim B.2, we use it to finish the proof of Theorem B.1. Notice that each of the polynomials has degree at most 2n + 2. For any pair k, , the Swartz-Zippel lemma then shows that, for p k = p , the probability (p k − p )(β i,b , . . . ) = 0 is at most (2n + 2)/p.
Let q e , q m , q p , q k be the total number of encode, Mult, Pair, and KeyGen queries made by A. Then the total length of L is at most |L| ≤ q e + q m + q p + (n + 2)q k + (2n + 5) Therefore, the number of pairs is at most |L| 2 ≤ (q e + q m + q p + (n + 2)q k + (2n + 5)) 2 /2 Therefore, Fail happens with probability at most (q e + q m + q p + (n + 2)q k + (2n + 5)) 2 (2n + 2)/2p
If Fail does not occur, B's simulation is perfect, and in this case c is independent from A's view (in particular, c was chosen after the simulation). It is straightforward to show that the A's advantage in winning the broadcast encryption experiment is at most (q e + q m + q p + (n + 2)q k + (2n + 5)) 2 (n + 1)/2p
For polynomial q e , q m , q p , q k , n, this is negligible provided 1/p is negligible, as desired. It remains to prove Claim B.2. Suppose there are two polynomials p k = p such that, when we replace the variable k c with αt, p k = p . This means p k − p = 0. Moreover, p k − p must have contained a k c term, and this term cannot have been multiplied by any other variables. Therefore, we can write p k − p as p k − p = C 0 k c + C 1 k 1−c (B.1) Where poly 0 has degree 1, each of the poly u has degree 1, and poly 1 has degree n + 1, and C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , C u are constants. If p k − p is non-zero, but substituting k c as αt makes the difference zero, we can conclude the following:
• C 0 = 0, C 1 = 0
• u =S C u = −C 0 . In particular, there is a u / ∈ S with C u = 0. Now pick some u / ∈ S with C u = 0 and expand out all of the polynomials, looking for monomials M = tr u n i=1 β i,u i . Clearly, Line B.1 gives no such monomials. All monomials in Line B.2 involving t contain a product n i=1 β i,v i for some v ∈ S -in particular, v = u. Therefore, Line B.2 gives no such monomials either. Line B.3 gives exactly one, with a coefficient of C u . Now, suppose Line B.4 (that is, poly 1 ) contained the monomial M . This means we can build M by taking the product of a subset of the terms t, [1,n] ,b∈{0,1} . We can infer the following:
• t must be included exactly once in the product
• r v β i,1−v i for any v / ∈ S, i ∈ {0, 1} cannot be included in the product. Otherwise, if v = u, there will be some β i,1−u i with positive exponent, and if v = u, then r v will have a positive exponent.
• r u must therefore be included exactly once in the product. r v for v = u cannot be included.
• β i,u i must be included for each i.
This means we must multiply n + 2 of the terms together, exceeding the maximum degree of poly 1 . Therefore, We conclude that Line B.4 does not have any monomial M . This means that the total coefficient for M is C u = 0. This is true even after substituting k b with αt, contradicting the assertion that p k − p = 0. This completes the proof of Theorem B.1.
